For visitors familiar with the five-star hotels of Africa's main
cities, Mango River's reputation as one of the best places to stay in
Juba, the capital of semi-autonomous south Sudan, can be misleading.
Not only does it have no stars, it is not even a hotel. Instead it is
a camp, which mixes the bleak uniformity of an army barracks with a
few other-worldly creature comforts, and, in the process, has become
an emblem for the rough-and- tumble boom town.
Guests are housed in khaki tents that trap the 40°C heat like an oven
but also have wireless internet access and a bar that serves Bloody
Mary cocktails. Until a recent price war it was charging $132 (€91,
£68) a night and is the peculiar product of the wild-west capitalism
driving a vibrant, foreign-run economy in Juba.
But as entrepreneurs repatriate their quick bucks, the town's economy
is stagnating and the process of development has barely started.
The divide between the two does matter because it means south Sudan is
not building what it needs: the foundations of a viable state. Its
government was formed by Christian bush fighters in 2005 after they
signed a peace deal that ended a five-decade civil war with the
Arab-led north and promised a referendum on secession in 2011.
But the administration has struggled to manage a unique combination of
forces: $1.1bn of non- humanitarian aid over the past two years,
$1.3bn of annual oil revenue, and an influx of United Nations
peacekeepers and tough- minded business people.
Because of inexperience, corruption and the absence of any state
apparatus - as well as the international community's decision to focus
on Darfur - it has little to show for its efforts. Until three years
ago Juba was a garrison town controlled by Khartoum and it remains
little more than a super-sized village with barely 1km of paved road.
Nobody is sure how many residents it has - estimates range from
320,000 to 1m - but most live in mud huts and their number is reckoned
to have doubled in the past three years as refugees return.
The beneficiaries of the boom are outsiders such as Henrik Tobiesen, a
former United Nations de-mining expert from Denmark, who last year set
up another place to stay called Global Camp. "I looked around and it
was ridiculous," he says. "There was no competition. You could do
anything."
Juba has at least a dozen similar camps charging up to $250 a night,
most of them filled with UN officials and aid workers. They are owned
by Kenyans and Egyptians, or companies such as Afex Group of the US
and Unity Resources Group from Australia, which controls Mango River.
The majority of their employees are non-Sudanese too.
The same is true of the bars and restaurants that cater to development
workers as well as civil servants and soldiers from the Sudan People's
Liberation Army, whose wages consume 70 per cent of south Sudan's
oil-flushed budget, according to one donor consultant.
Whereas Juba was supplied by air from Khartoum during the war, today
almost everything consumed by the town's better-off inhabitants - from
potatoes and pineapples to Pringles crisps and Johnnie Walker whisky -
is imported by road by Ugandan traders, although their supply lines
have been disrupted by Kenya's chaos.
The traders congregate in Custom Market, a bustling maze of shacks and
parasols where Caroline Ninisima, who is saving to study business
administration in Kampala, sells paint brushes, pliers and pipes to
the construction industry.
"I came to make money," she says. "In Uganda there are very many
competitors, but here the need for building materials is big and the
competitors are few."
David Gressly, the deputy resident co-ordinator for the UN, says the
town's cowboy capitalism must be tamed: "One of the key challenges . .
. is to put in place an investment code, together with clear laws on
property rights that are enforced by the judiciary."
The camp hotels contribute "peanuts" to the government, says Barri
Wanji, chair of the south Sudan parliament's finance committee. But he
adds: "Let me reassure you we know what's going on. We've decided to
let them have a good time until we get the legal system in place."
Tuesday, August 5, 2008
Dr. John's Unique political number line
August 5, 2008 — This July, we need to make a progress report on Dr John Garang’s solution modalities in the Sudan conflict. According to the digression, Sudan can only exist in one of five possible political formats. He presented his thesis in a scientific approach with a mathematical illustration. So far I have not seen any challenge to his model. The sequencing of the presentation of the models is intriguing because it never follows the standard number line; one- two- three- four- five. Instead he had his own number pattern; three-four-two-one-five. In this review we shall retain Dr John’s unique number line.
Model 3
Before January 9th 2005, the Sudan was an Arab Islamic state in which the South was a tolerated but dominated entity within it. This model was the cause of the conflict. As long as it remained in effect, the country would be unstable and could, in the long run lead to the break up of the country. In Garang’s own words: “Model 3 is the present Islamic Arab Sudan. It is the problem. The non Arab and non Moslems are excluded from this type of Sudan. Now it is even worse. To be included in this Sudan one has to be an NIF. So those of Mansour Khalid are not included in this type of Sudan. This model is unstable. It has led to two wars: the Anyanya war and the present SPLM/SPLA war. That is the old Sudan and it must go”.
Today, we can say that the CPA has vindicated Dr John Garang’s assertion with respect to Model 3. It has been outlawed by the CPA and the interim national constitution. Has it actually vanished in practice? Yes and no; depending on which part of the elephant the blind man is touching. If you ask Comrade Salva Kiir, the old Sudan is staggering away like a drunken man. Whether it will reach the horizon and disappear or return to torment us is the mother of all questions. Dr Mansour Khalid describes the CPA as the bridge between the old and the New Sudan. The fate of the Sudan will depend on whether our leaders choose to cross the bridge or to double cross it.
Model 4 is the inverse of model three; a secular African State where the North is a tolerated but dominated entity within a united Sudan. Like model three, this arrangement would be unstable and could also lead to the break up of the country in the long run. According to Dr Garang, “Model 4 is for a united black African Sudan. It is a hypothetical model but it is not far fetched. If the 31 % Arab population can claim to have an Arab Sudan, there is no reason why the 69% Africans cannot claim a black African Sudan. This model is also unstable. The non Africans can resist this model and call for their own state”. This arrangement never existed in Sudan’s contemporary history so it is really provided as a scientific analogy.
Model 2
The Sudan is now three years into model two which for all practical purposes is the CPA arrangement of temporary power sharing. The CPA created a one-country-two systems Sudan as we all know. There are some salient and subtle differences between the CPA and the original model two. Model two speaks about three entities; a Southern state a Northern state and a common entity (Confederate Government). The CPA has only two governments: a Southern and a National government. It is very interesting to read Dr John’s pre-CPA text and see, with the benefit of our three years’ experience, whether the North and the South are converging towards a more cohesive unity or drifting farther apart. He said “model two is a transitional model. This is the confederal model. The essence of it is that we have two states; one in the north and one in the south linked by a central authority responsible for the matters in which we have an agreement. These are what we call the commonalities. It is a model to end the war. You end the war by accepting the realities of the country. There is no way, for instance, in which we can compromise on the question of Islamic Sharia no matter how it is coated. We believe that we must leave the issue of Sharia or no Sharia to each state to decide for itself. Those who want it can have it 100%. They can cut off their hands if they want to. We are opposed to the practice but we are not going to stick out our necks for it.
Meanwhile in the South we would have a secular state. This model can end the war and can be stable during the interim period. It is also a model that can resolve the issue of Islamic fundamentalism if there is cooperation from the international community. If we have a Sudan that is characterized by this structure and we have free movement of people, goods and services, this would provide a serious challenge to the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan and beyond. If the southern part of our country develops very rapidly and has the correct economic and political system, then it would have a demonstration effect on the north. We would have development going from the south to the north. I have given the example of somebody sitting in Khartoum thirsty for a glass of cold beer. Since there is freedom of movement he can get his cold beer in Juba. So he will have to take a flight to Juba each time he needs a beer. After a while he will begin to ask why he cannot have his beer in Khartoum. Thus during the interim period, if the Southern economy works very well, the pilgrimage might be to Juba rather than to Mecca. This is how communism collapsed. It was undermined through the demonstration effect. In this respect, this model is subversive”.
Model 1
During the transitional or interim period, the people of the north and the south can reduce their historical disagreements over identity, development, discrimination, stereotyping, domination, marginalization, prejudice etcetera. During this period, the northerners and the southerners can expand their areas of common interest like patriotism, nationalism, health, religious tolerance, culture, sports etcetera. If these things happen, the Southern and Northern entities would merge to form one united democratic secular Sudan of justice and equality for all regardless of religion, race or gender. In Dr Garang’s words, “The confederal model can lead to the creation of the New Sudan through the expansion of the commonalties over time. That is the maximum possible outcome. The SPLM/SPLA National Convention decided not to wait for that day. They have already defined the New Sudan to consist, for the time being, of the South as per its borders of January 1956 and the areas of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile. Other parts of the country may join as future developments unfold.
Model 5
If Model two fails to reconcile northern and southern aspirations, then the inevitable outcome would be a break up of the country. If, during the interim period, disequilibrium in economic development continues to persist between the north and the south, if we do not come to terms with the reality that we are Sudanese first and anything else second, if the factors that unite do not expand, if the factors that divide do not diminish, then the Sudan falls apart. Model 5 is therefore a residual result of our failure to unite rather than a strategic objective. Let us get this point from the horse’s mouth. “The confederal model can also lead to the disintegration of the country through the diminution of the commonalties during the interim period or the lack of them in the first place. We underlined this very point in Abuja (in 1992); that if we cannot rise to the challenge and move to the New Sudan, it is better that the Sudan breaks up (to two parts) before it breaks down (to innumerable fragments)”.
Model 3
Before January 9th 2005, the Sudan was an Arab Islamic state in which the South was a tolerated but dominated entity within it. This model was the cause of the conflict. As long as it remained in effect, the country would be unstable and could, in the long run lead to the break up of the country. In Garang’s own words: “Model 3 is the present Islamic Arab Sudan. It is the problem. The non Arab and non Moslems are excluded from this type of Sudan. Now it is even worse. To be included in this Sudan one has to be an NIF. So those of Mansour Khalid are not included in this type of Sudan. This model is unstable. It has led to two wars: the Anyanya war and the present SPLM/SPLA war. That is the old Sudan and it must go”.
Today, we can say that the CPA has vindicated Dr John Garang’s assertion with respect to Model 3. It has been outlawed by the CPA and the interim national constitution. Has it actually vanished in practice? Yes and no; depending on which part of the elephant the blind man is touching. If you ask Comrade Salva Kiir, the old Sudan is staggering away like a drunken man. Whether it will reach the horizon and disappear or return to torment us is the mother of all questions. Dr Mansour Khalid describes the CPA as the bridge between the old and the New Sudan. The fate of the Sudan will depend on whether our leaders choose to cross the bridge or to double cross it.
Model 4 is the inverse of model three; a secular African State where the North is a tolerated but dominated entity within a united Sudan. Like model three, this arrangement would be unstable and could also lead to the break up of the country in the long run. According to Dr Garang, “Model 4 is for a united black African Sudan. It is a hypothetical model but it is not far fetched. If the 31 % Arab population can claim to have an Arab Sudan, there is no reason why the 69% Africans cannot claim a black African Sudan. This model is also unstable. The non Africans can resist this model and call for their own state”. This arrangement never existed in Sudan’s contemporary history so it is really provided as a scientific analogy.
Model 2
The Sudan is now three years into model two which for all practical purposes is the CPA arrangement of temporary power sharing. The CPA created a one-country-two systems Sudan as we all know. There are some salient and subtle differences between the CPA and the original model two. Model two speaks about three entities; a Southern state a Northern state and a common entity (Confederate Government). The CPA has only two governments: a Southern and a National government. It is very interesting to read Dr John’s pre-CPA text and see, with the benefit of our three years’ experience, whether the North and the South are converging towards a more cohesive unity or drifting farther apart. He said “model two is a transitional model. This is the confederal model. The essence of it is that we have two states; one in the north and one in the south linked by a central authority responsible for the matters in which we have an agreement. These are what we call the commonalities. It is a model to end the war. You end the war by accepting the realities of the country. There is no way, for instance, in which we can compromise on the question of Islamic Sharia no matter how it is coated. We believe that we must leave the issue of Sharia or no Sharia to each state to decide for itself. Those who want it can have it 100%. They can cut off their hands if they want to. We are opposed to the practice but we are not going to stick out our necks for it.
Meanwhile in the South we would have a secular state. This model can end the war and can be stable during the interim period. It is also a model that can resolve the issue of Islamic fundamentalism if there is cooperation from the international community. If we have a Sudan that is characterized by this structure and we have free movement of people, goods and services, this would provide a serious challenge to the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan and beyond. If the southern part of our country develops very rapidly and has the correct economic and political system, then it would have a demonstration effect on the north. We would have development going from the south to the north. I have given the example of somebody sitting in Khartoum thirsty for a glass of cold beer. Since there is freedom of movement he can get his cold beer in Juba. So he will have to take a flight to Juba each time he needs a beer. After a while he will begin to ask why he cannot have his beer in Khartoum. Thus during the interim period, if the Southern economy works very well, the pilgrimage might be to Juba rather than to Mecca. This is how communism collapsed. It was undermined through the demonstration effect. In this respect, this model is subversive”.
Model 1
During the transitional or interim period, the people of the north and the south can reduce their historical disagreements over identity, development, discrimination, stereotyping, domination, marginalization, prejudice etcetera. During this period, the northerners and the southerners can expand their areas of common interest like patriotism, nationalism, health, religious tolerance, culture, sports etcetera. If these things happen, the Southern and Northern entities would merge to form one united democratic secular Sudan of justice and equality for all regardless of religion, race or gender. In Dr Garang’s words, “The confederal model can lead to the creation of the New Sudan through the expansion of the commonalties over time. That is the maximum possible outcome. The SPLM/SPLA National Convention decided not to wait for that day. They have already defined the New Sudan to consist, for the time being, of the South as per its borders of January 1956 and the areas of Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile. Other parts of the country may join as future developments unfold.
Model 5
If Model two fails to reconcile northern and southern aspirations, then the inevitable outcome would be a break up of the country. If, during the interim period, disequilibrium in economic development continues to persist between the north and the south, if we do not come to terms with the reality that we are Sudanese first and anything else second, if the factors that unite do not expand, if the factors that divide do not diminish, then the Sudan falls apart. Model 5 is therefore a residual result of our failure to unite rather than a strategic objective. Let us get this point from the horse’s mouth. “The confederal model can also lead to the disintegration of the country through the diminution of the commonalties during the interim period or the lack of them in the first place. We underlined this very point in Abuja (in 1992); that if we cannot rise to the challenge and move to the New Sudan, it is better that the Sudan breaks up (to two parts) before it breaks down (to innumerable fragments)”.
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